Strength of socio-political attitudes moderates electrophysiological responses to perceptual anomalies by Reiss, Stefan et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Strength of socio-political attitudes
moderates electrophysiological responses to
perceptual anomalies
Stefan ReissID1*, Johannes Klackl1, Travis Proulx2, Eva Jonas1
1 Dept. of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria, 2 School of Psychology, Cardiff University,
Cardiff, United Kingdom
* stefan.reiss@sbg.ac.at
Abstract
People with strong (vs. moderate) political attitudes have been shown to exhibit less phasic
reactivity to perceptual anomalies, presumably to prevent their committed meaning systems
from being challenged by novel experiences. Several researchers have proposed that (but
not tested whether) firmly committed individuals also engage in more attentional suppres-
sion of anomalies, likely mediated by prestimulus alpha power. We expected participants
with strong (vs. moderate) political attitudes to display increased pre-stimulus alpha power
when processing perceptual anomalies. We recorded electrophysiological activity during
the presentation of normal cards (control group) or both normal and anomalous playing
cards (experimental group; total N = 191). In line with our predictions, the presence of anom-
alous playing cards in the stimulus set increased prestimulus alpha power only among indi-
viduals with strong but not moderate political attitudes. As potential markers of phasic
reactivity, we also analyzed the late positive potential (LPP) and earlier components of the
event-related potential, namely P1, N1, and P300. The moderating effect of extreme atti-
tudes on ERP amplitudes remained inconclusive. Altogether, our findings support the
idea that ideological conviction is related to increased tonic responses to perceptual
anomalies.
Introduction
Recently, a branch of psychological research has emerged that deals with biological correlates
of political attitudes and orientation. Political neuroscience combines political science, psychol-
ogy and cognitive neuroscience [1] to investigate whether biological or even genetic factors
underlie interindividual differences in political orientation [2]. Differences between liberals
and conservatives have been reported in a variety of experiments, a key factor therein being
negativity bias [3]. For instance, liberals have been hypothesized as being more sensitive to
cognitive conflict than conservatives, as indicated by higher error-related negativity (ERN)
amplitude in a Go/No-Go task [4]. In contrast, conservatives have been found to react more
strongly to threatening and emotionally arousing stimuli [5,6].
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732 August 5, 2019 1 / 17
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Reiss S, Klackl J, Proulx T, Jonas E
(2019) Strength of socio-political attitudes
moderates electrophysiological responses to
perceptual anomalies. PLoS ONE 14(8): e0220732.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732
Editor: Jose´ A. Hinojosa, Universidad Complutense
Madrid, SPAIN
Received: April 9, 2019
Accepted: July 22, 2019
Published: August 5, 2019
Copyright: © 2019 Reiss et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the manuscript and its Supporting
Information files.
Funding: Research was supported by the Austrian
Science Fund (FWF-P27457). SR has been
supported by the Doctoral College “Imaging the
Mind” of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-W1233-
G17).
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
The role of strong political views in perception and processing of anomalies
There is research that suggests that it is not the content of worldviews and belief systems that
defines individuals’ reactions to anomalies, inconsistencies, expectancy violations and commit-
ted errors, but rather the rigidity and conviction with which they cling to these frameworks.
Research in the 1960s started investigating the similarities of conservatives and liberals, arguing
that extremists on both sides of the political spectrum tend to make more stereotypical attribu-
tions and find earlier perceptual closure than politically neutral individuals [7]. As such, Brandt
et al. [8] stated that ‘both liberals and conservatives will dig in their heels to defend their ideo-
logical values and beliefs’ when experiencing threatening stimuli (p. 307). This statement seems
to be valid beyond social attitudes, as illustrated by findings on religiosity. Inzlicht and col-
leagues found differences in ERN after errors in a Stroop test were attenuated in those high (vs.
moderate) in religious commitment. These individuals appeared to shift attention away from
potentially anxiety-evoking stimuli, presumably to reduce uncertainty and error [9,10].
Individuals with strong attitudes—either liberal or conservative—have fortified belief sys-
tems that subjectively need to be protected from attacks. The idea that relative attitude strength
(the deviation from neutrality) is more important than the attitude content is supported by the
finding that participants tend to affirm their pre-existing attitudes–be they liberal or conserva-
tive–when confronted with threats such as mortality salience [11,12], challenges to their world-
views [13] or meaning violations [14]. This view of political and attitude rigidity implies
higher rigidity on either end of the political spectrum than in centrist beliefs. As radical politi-
cal stances require “drawing political frontiers and defining an adversary” [15], centrist and
moderate beliefs are by nature less rigid than those on the far ends of the spectrum.
Meaning maintenance and general threat model
More generally, humans construe frameworks and schemas to predict experiences. The mean-
ing maintenance model or MMM [16–18] defines meaning as expected relationships between
people, places, objects and ideas construed to make the world predictable. Experiences that are
at odds with these frameworks lead to feelings of uncertainty, disanxiousuncertlibrium [18,19],
entropy [20] or anxiety [20]. These effects have been found even for subtle, non-conscious
expectancy violations like having people read passages of absurdist literature, humor and art
[21–23], or covertly swapping experimenters without participants noticing [24].
Another subtle violation of expectancies is the presentation of reverse-colored playing cards
[25]: when asked to indicate the parity or suit of playing cards with anomalous colors such as a
black queen of hearts or red three of clubs, some participants showed increased signs of dis-
tress and arousal. Most participants first did not explicitly notice the manipulated cards but
showed ‘perceptual denial’ [24], suggesting that they assimilated the cards to match existing
schemas. Despite being a task-irrelevant feature and remaining undetected by participants,
anomalous cards increased pupil dilation (PD) compared with a control condition where only
normal cards were presented, indicating some form of physiological response [26]. Further-
more, Sleegers et al. [26] showed that participants with strong political attitudes—either liberal
or conservative—exhibited smaller pupillary dilation responses to the presentation of anoma-
lous playing cards.
The findings seem to converge on one possible explanation: that individuals with strong
ideological convictions, regardless of ideological orientation, allocate less attention to anoma-
lies, arguably by means of attentional suppression [9,27]. However, this hypothesis has yet to
be directly investigated. Thus, in this paper, we aim to gauge the influence of attitude strength
on an electroencephalography (EEG) measure that is closely related to attentional suppression:
spectral power in the alpha frequency band (8–13 Hz).
Political attitudes and perceptual anomalies
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Two ways of addressing expectancy violations
When encountering expectancy violations, one may distinguish between at least two basic
kinds of neuronal processes, namely phasic and tonic processes. Phasic neural processes reflect
post-stimulus reactivity to the “odd” attributes of the perceived stimuli and trigger discrep-
ancy-related neural markers such as activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is
commonly related to error detection, higher ERN amplitude, and increased pupil dilation
[9,26,28]. On the other hand, inconsistencies may also instigate tonic processes such as sup-
pression, which enable assimilation, that is, (mis-)perceiving the inconsistent stimulus as
being consistent with a pre-existing framework.
With expectancy violations that typically go unnoticed, such as anomalous playing cards,
tonic neuronal processes may even prevent phasic reactivity. As a result, inconsistent stimulus
features (i.e. suit/color mismatch) may not become salient to participants. In this example, one
may argue that expectations about correspondences between colors and suits of playing cards
(hearts are red and spades are black) remain unaltered, despite observing cards that do not
match these expectations. In other terms, phasic processes that serve to detect inconsistencies
may often fail to appear due to tonic attentional suppression.
According to our view, the dominance of tonic inhibitory over phasic reactive processes
should be especially prevalent among individuals with stronger, more rigid meaning frame-
works (i.e. political beliefs). For this research, the most important EEG measure is prestimulus
alpha power which represents tonic attentional suppression. We also investigate ERP compo-
nents for exploratory reasons.
Prestimulus alpha power and attentional suppression. The alpha frequency band (8–13
Hz) is heavily involved in the facilitation and inhibition of stimulus processing [29–33]. Corti-
cal oscillations in this frequency band are inversely correlated with how much attention indi-
viduals devote to stimuli, and how much neural activation these stimuli produce. Thus, higher
alpha power is related to greater inhibition of stimulus processing [34–36]. For example, lower
prestimulus alpha power predicts better performance in identifying briefly presented letters
[29,30]. In contrast, higher prestimulus alpha power over parieto-occipital regions has been
associated with worse performance in a visual contrast discrimination task; this has been inter-
preted as reflecting inhibition of visual processing [33].
When anticipating sensory input, alpha power in task-relevant cortical regions decreases,
presumably to release inhibition and facilitate information intake. For example, alpha power
has been shown to decrease when the appearance of a target stimulus can be anticipated;
alpha power was lowest right before the anticipated stimulus onset, suggesting top-down
biasing in cortical excitability through disinhibition [32]. Conversely, blocking out irrelevant
information reflects an increased prestimulus alpha power: when expecting auditory stimuli,
alpha power in (task-irrelevant) occipital regions increases, indicating functional inhibition
[37]. In the same vein, alpha power is increased in cortical areas corresponding to parts of
the visual field in which visual input needs to be ignored [31]. To summarize, prestimulus
alpha seems to be an indicator of how much attention is deployed prior to stimulus onset
[38,39].
Event-related potentials (ERP) and reactive processing. Despite our main interest being
spectral alpha power, we are also interested in instantaneous, phasic responses to expectancy
violations. We will thus investigate event-related potentials in exploratory analyses. Previous
research has shown differences in pupillary reactions to anomalous playing cards depending
on political extremism [26]. However, the relation between pupil dilation (PD) and ERP mea-
sures is not straight forward: experiments investigating paradigms such as auditory [40] or
visual oddball tasks [41] reported no correlation between PD and the P300 component,
Political attitudes and perceptual anomalies
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suggesting that ERP components and PD are not functionally equivalent in indicating the
underlying phasic processes.
The late positive potential (LPP) is an ERP component that is hypothesized to reflect atten-
tion to motivationally significant stimuli. It is most prominent along centroparietal sites and is
larger for both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli compared to neutral stimuli [42]. In threat-
and-defense research, LPP has been shown to be higher for threat-related words than unpleas-
ant but threat-unrelated words, pleasant words, and neutral words [43,44]. The LPP also has
been proposed to indicate the affective significance of a stimulus through motivational activa-
tion of appetitive and defensive systems [45]. Thus, the LPP seems to reflect both top-down
and stimulus-driven bottom-up processes–the presence of motivationally relevant stimuli
increases the allocation of attention to them. However, the correlation between LPP and PD
has been inconclusive for both novel and emotional stimuli [46].
Given the findings of Sleegers et al. [26] that politically extreme individuals react to percep-
tual anomalies with attenuated pupillary responses, and the assumptions of attentional gating,
our hypothesis in this study is as follows: Participants with strong political stances (compared
with participants with a moderate stance) will show increased prestimulus alpha power when
presented with anomalous cards.
To summarize, this paper aims to explore electrocortical correlates of perceptual anomalies
and how they are moderated by political attitudes and values. We chose an ethnocentrism
measure for the attitude assessment since at the time of recording the data, the refugee situa-
tion was topical in Europe [47,48]. Some individuals regarded the emigration of refugees from
the Middle East as a potential threat to their national or ethnic group, whereas others sup-
ported immigration to Europe because they saw it as a moral imperative and clung less to the
idea of having to defend their own ethnic group. The existence of this controversy seemed to
make ethnocentrism an ideal value upon which to calculate the strength of socio-political atti-
tudes. Bizumic and colleagues defined ethnocentrism as ‘a sense of ethnic self-centeredness
and self-importance’ that involves seeing one’s own group as more important that other
groups, and more important than its individual members [48].
We expected participants with strong (vs. moderate) attitudes to show higher prestimulus
alpha power when confronted with expectancy-violating stimuli. Furthermore, we analyzed
the ERP components P1, N1, P300, and LPP to investigate potential indices of increased phasic
neural responses to the same expectancy-violating stimuli.
Method
Ethical approval for the research was granted by the ethics committee of the Paris Lodron Uni-
versity Salzburg and participants gave their written informed consent to participate in the
study. All data and the analysis script can be found in S1 Dataset.
Participants
Data were collected in two waves across two academic years. The final sample consisted of 191
participants (115 female, 22 undisclosed; aged 22.99 ± 3.60 years): 98 participants were presented
with only normal cards (control group) and 93 participants were presented with both normal and
anomalous cards (experimental group). All participants gave informed consent and could inter-
rupt their participation in the study at any point; no participant withdrew from the experiment.
Materials and procedure
Scales and measures. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in the laboratory,
and EEG electrodes were applied. All questionnaires and tasks were presented using Inquisit
Political attitudes and perceptual anomalies
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4.0.8 [49] on a 15.6-inch screen with 1980 × 1080 pixel resolution. After the briefing, a 3-min
baseline EEG recording (to control for interindividual differences in alpha power) and some
filler tasks, participants completed the card task, described in more detail below. Following the
card task, participants filled out an ethnocentrism questionnaire. Handedness and demo-
graphic data were assessed. Participants were debriefed and rewarded with money or partial
course credit.
Ethnocentrism. To gauge participants’ political attitudes, we used a ten-item scale previ-
ously employed by Agroskin and Jonas [50]: the scale consists of six items from the 60-item
ethnocentrism scale by Bizumic et al. [51], and four items reflecting anti-immigrant attitudes
[50]. Exemplary items were “No matter what, I will always support my cultural or ethnic group
and never let it down” and “My country’s economy should be protected against mass im-
migration”. All items were rated on a six-point likert scale (α = .75, M = 2.08, SD = 0.67).
Lower values indicate attitudes more socially liberal than conservative. The sample mean was
significantly lower than the scale midpoint; t(190) = -29.26, p< .001. We calculated strength
of political attitude as the difference in value of each participant’s ethnocentrism score from
the sample mean; thus, a lower value indicates moderate attitude strength, and a high value
indicates a large deviation from the sample mean, either toward low or high ethnocentrism. As
the deviation measure was not normally distributed, we log-transformed it to approach normal
distribution (see Fig 1).
Card task. We used a mixed design for our experiment: Participants were assigned to the
experimental or the control group in a between-subjects fashion. For participants in the con-
trol group, all trials consisted of regularly colored playing cards. In the experimental group,
half of the stimuli were reverse-colored, that is, anomalous playing cards, and t half were nor-
mal playing cards. This created the opportunity for a within-subjects comparison within the
Fig 1. Distribution of ethnocentrism scores. (A) Absolute ethnocentrism values and (B) log-normalized deviations from sample mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g001
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experimental group (Fig 2). To test our hypotheses, we focused on the between-subjects
manipulation. For exploratory purposes, we will also report the effects for the within-subjects
manipulation. Each participant was presented with 180 trials. For the second wave of partici-
pants (n2 = 112), we adapted the procedure to accommodate another study not relevant to this
report. Therefore, we reduced the trial count in the card task to 140 trials (56 probe trials). A
schematic representation of the trials can be seen in Fig 3. In each trial, a fixation cross was
present in the center of the screen for 2000 ms, followed by a playing card displayed for 1000
ms. In 72 trials, the card was followed by a probe trial–a card featuring a question mark,
prompting the participants to indicate as fast as possible via button press whether the previ-
ously presented card had an even or odd value. The task was employed to ensure participants
were paying attention to the cards while keeping the manipulation of the cards’ colors as a
non-central, task-irrelevant feature. Four of the participants reported recognizing the anoma-
lous nature of the manipulated cards and were excluded from the data analysis because once
aware of the manipulation, participants may react differently to subsequent presentations of
anomalous stimuli [26].
When calculating reaction times, we excluded incorrect responses and responses that were
faster than 200 ms and slower than 2 SDs over the individual mean reaction time [52,53].
EEG recordings. EEG was recorded using a REFA 72 digital amplifier system (TMSi, Old-
enzaal, The Netherlands). EEG signals were recorded with an average reference. We re-refer-
enced the data offline to a calculated average of TP9 and TP10. Using a EEG cap (TMSi), 64
Ag/AgCl-electrodes were placed on following locations (according to international 10–20 sys-
tem): AF3, AF4, AF7, AF8, AFz, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, CPz,
Cz, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6, FCz, Fp1, Fp2, FT7, FT8,
FT9, FT10, Fz, O1, O2, Oz, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, POz, Pz, T7,
T8, TP7, TP8, TP9 and TP10. Vertical EOG was recorded from sites above and below the left
eye. A wet band on the left wrist served as ground electrode and impedances were kept under
50kΩ, which is uncommon yet appropriate for this kind of high-input impedance amplifier
[54]. Data collection was controlled by Polybench software 1.25 (TMSi). EEG data were
Fig 2. Stimuli of the card task. Examples for normal (left) and anomalous playing cards (right) used in the
experiment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g002
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recorded at 512 Hz sampling rate. Offline analysis of the EEG data was conducted using Brain-
VisionAnalyzer (BrainProducts, Inc.).
For the time-frequency analyses, segments ranging from -2000 to 1000 ms relative to stimu-
lus onset were created. Segments containing eye artifacts were corrected using Gratton &
Cole’s method [55], and epochs containing artifacts were rejected automatically using the
same settings as mentioned above. Time-frequency decomposition was performed by applying
a Morlet complex with 40 linear frequency steps (1–40 Hz) with a Morlet parameter of 5, to tri-
als containing normal and anomalous cards; the resulting wavelets were averaged for each of
the conditions. For the analysis of the alpha frequency band, the wavelet layers with 8, 9, 10,
11, and 12 Hz central frequency were extracted and averaged across parieto-occipital and
occipital sites (PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, POz, O1, O2, and Oz). For the baseline alpha power, the
three-min signal was segmented in 2000 ms segments (1500 ms overlap) and subjected to the
same transformation process as described above.
For the exploratory ERP analyses, the data were band-pass filtered (0.1–30 Hz, 24 dB/oct
slope) and resampled to 256 Hz. For the single trials, epochs ranging from -200 to 1000 ms rel-
ative to stimulus onset were created, rendering a total of 180 segments per subject. Epochs con-
taining eye blinks were corrected using Gratton & Cole’s method [55]. Epochs with extreme
values (changes >100 μV within 100 ms, or values > 100 μV or < -100 μV) were rejected.
ERPs were calculated by averaging the signals of normal card trials and reversed card trials,
separately. Finally, ERPs were baseline-corrected (-200 ms until stimulus onset). Amplitudes
of the early ERP peaks were extracted after performing semiautomatic peak detection: for the
P1, local positive maxima were searched 65–100 ms post stimulus onset and pooled (α = .94)
over eight posterior sites (POz, PO3, PO7, PO4, PO8, Oz, O1, O2); for the N1, local negative
Fig 3. Time course of trials with and without response.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g003
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maxima were searched between 110–150 ms post stimulus onset and pooled over four sites
(POz, Oz, O1, O2). For the late positive potential (LPP), we scored the mean amplitude 400–
800 ms post stimulus onset over the centro-parietal sites P1, P2, Pz, CP1, CP2, and CPz, since
LPP is typically most prominent over these sites [6,56]. P300 was analyzed by collapsing the
parietal sites P3, Pz, and P4 in the time window 200–400 ms post stimulus onset [57].
To investigate the influence of perceptual anomalies and political attitude strength on ERP
amplitudes and prestimulus alpha power, we entered experimental group (anomalous card
group vs. normal card group), attitude strength, and their interaction term as predictors into
multiple regression models using the pequod package for R [58]. A sensitivity analysis using
G�Power [59] revealed that the present sample size of 191 participants provided 96% power to
detect an effect size of f2 = 0.10 for the moderation effect.
Results
Behavioral results
Overall, participants gave mostly correct answers to the probe trials, M = 94%, SD = 9.7%.
There was no difference in accuracy between the experimental groups; t(188.8) = -0.62, p =
.53, Cohen’s d = 0.09. Furthermore, the accuracy of participants in the experimental condition
did not differ as a function of whether the probe trials featured a normal or an anomalous
card; t(91) = -1.24, p = .22, Cohen’s d = 0.13.
The comparison of reaction times in correctly answered probe trials prompting a button
press indicated that there was a significant difference between subjects in the experimental and
the control group; t(187.02) = 1.99, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 0.29. Participants in the experimental
group who were presented with both normal and anomalous cards (M = 732 ms, SD = 361 ms)
reacted slightly faster to the probe trials than participants in the control group (M = 835 ms,
SD = 350 ms). Comparing the reaction times within the experimental group, reaction times
for normal and anomalous cards did not differ significantly (Mnormal = 732 ms, SD = 361 ms;
Manomalous = 726 ms, SD = 349 ms; t(91) = 1.04, p = .30, Cohen’s d = 0.11). Thus, experimental
group and card type did not affect task accuracy but had a small but significant effect on speed.
EEG results
Alpha frequency. We investigated the moderating effect of attitude strength on the rela-
tionship between the experimental manipulation and alpha power in the prestimulus interval
(2000–0 ms relative to stimulus onset). We entered card condition group as predictor (0 = nor-
mal cards only; 1 = normal and anomalous cards), and attitude strength as moderator in a lin-
ear regression model; we controlled for the individual differences in resting alpha power by
adding baseline alpha power as covariate of no interest (β = 0.89, t(158) = 26.64, p< .0001). To
control for the influence of data collection wave, we also entered the data collection time as a
between-subjects factor.
Participants in the experimental condition showed more pre-stimulus alpha power than
those in the control condition, β = 0.10, t(158) = 2.10, p = .037; attitude strength did not pre-
dict alpha power, β = -0.06, t(158) = -1.07, p = .286. Most importantly, we found a significant
condition × attitude strength interaction, β = 0.16, t(158) = 2.14, p = .034, f2 = 0.07. With the
present sample size, we achieved a power of β = .92 to detect the interaction effect (GPower;
Faul et al., 2007). A simple slope analysis revealed that the interaction effect was mainly due to
alpha power differences between the control and experimental condition in participants high
in attitude strength, b = 8.20, t = 2.97, p = .003; in participants with moderate attitudes, there
were no differences between the experimental groups, b = -1.10, t = -0.39, p = .70; see Fig 4.
Political attitudes and perceptual anomalies
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There was a significant interaction between experimental group and data collection time,
β = -0.15, t(158) = -2.49, p = .014. Simple slopes analysis of this two-way interaction revealed
that in the first data wave, participants in the experimental group showed higher alpha power
than those in the control group; t(158) = 2.10, p = .037. In the second wave, this was not the
case; t(158) = -1.38, p = .170.
There was no significant three-way interaction effect between the experimental group, atti-
tude strength, and data wave, β = -0.11, t(158) = -1.40, p = .164, indicating that the time of data
collection did not influence the moderating effect of political attitude strength on alpha power.
In a mixed linear model, we analyzed alpha power within participants in the experimental
group with attitude strength and baseline alpha power as random effects. Fixed effects showed
that there was no effect of card type on prestimulus alpha power, b = 0.38, t(85.09) = 0.86, p =
.39, but a significant effect of attitude strength, b = 1.42, t(9.84) = 2.79, p = .020. Card type did
not interact with attitude strength, b = -0.12, t(85.09) = -0.35, p = .73. Thus, while there were
no differences between normal and anomalous cards, strength of political attitude predicted
higher prestimulus alpha power in the experimental condition.
In addition, we performed the same analysis of prestimulus alpha power with absolute eth-
nocentrism as predictor. The details of the regression model can be found in S1 Supplementary
Analyses. In short, there was a marginally significant first-order effect of ethnocentrism on
prestimulus alpha power (β = 0.14, t(158) = 1.95, p = .053), but no other first-order or interac-
tion effects. Thus, while there were differences in alpha power between individuals low and
high in ethnocentrism, these differences were not influenced by the presence of anomalies.
Exploratory ERP analyses. P1. Analysis of the P1 component revealed no significant
effects of experimental group (β = -0.01, t(159) = -0.10, p = .92), attitude strength (β = 0.04, t
Fig 4. Alpha power simple slopes. Simple slope analysis of pre-stimulus alpha power (8–13 Hz) as a function of ethnocentric attitude strength for
participants in the experimental vs. control group, averaged across PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, POz, O1, O2, and Oz. Baseline alpha power is covaried out.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g004
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(159) = 0.30, p = .76), or data set (β = 0.03, t(159) = 0.30, p = .76). There was no moderating
effect of attitude strength on P1 amplitude, β = -0.16, t(159) = -0.87, p = .39. There were also
no two-way or three-way interactions between the predictors (all β< .12, t< 0.86, p> .38).
Simple slopes of the experimental group � attitude strength interaction can be seen in Fig 5A.
The within-subjects analysis using a linear mixed model showed no effect of card type, atti-
tude strength, nor their interaction on P1 amplitudes in participants in the experimental
group (all b< .30, t< 0.68, p> .50).
N1. Analysis of the N1 component revealed a marginal effect of experimental group (β =
-0.20, t(157) = -1.75, p = .083). Participants in the experimental group showed marginally
stronger N1 amplitudes than those in the control group. There was no first-order effect of atti-
tude strength (β = 0.17, t(157) = 1.19, p = .23), but a significant effect of data set (β = -0.26,
t(157) = -2.35, p = .020), indicating that in the second data wave, participants showed higher
N1 amplitudes than in the first one. There was a marginally significant interaction between
attitude strength and experimental group, β = -0.30, t(157) = -1.68, p = .096 (see Fig 5B). Par-
ticipants with stronger (vs. moderate) attitudes showed increased N1 amplitudes in the experi-
mental group (vs. control group).
Fig 5. ERP simple slopes. Exploratory simple slope analyses of ERP components. (A) P1, (B) N1, (C) P300, and (D) LPP amplitudes as a function of ethnocentric
attitude strength (1 SD below and above sample mean) and card group.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g005
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The within-subjects analysis using a linear mixed model showed no effect of card type, atti-
tude strength, nor their interaction on participants’ N1 amplitudes in the experimental group
(all b< .64, t< 1.09, p> .28).
P300. Amplitude of the P300 component was not influenced by experimental group, atti-
tude strength, or data set. Furthermore, two-way and three-way interactions were not signifi-
cant, all β< .15, t< 1.10, p> .27. Importantly, there was no moderating effect of attitude
strength on P300 amplitude, β = -0.12, t(161) = -0.65, p = .52 (Fig 5C). There were also no dif-
ferences in P300 amplitude when comparing normal and anomalous cards within the experi-
mental group, all b< 0.15, t< 0.89, p> .37.
Late positive potential (LPP). LPP amplitude was not predicted by attitude strength; β =
0.16, t(160) = 1.08, p = .28. There was no significant influence of experimental group on LPP
amplitude; β = 0.12, t(160) = 0.95, p = .32. The interaction, that is, the moderating effect of atti-
tude strength, was also not significant; β = -0.13, t = -0.71, p = .48, f2 = .01; see Fig 5D. Against
our expectations, participants with moderate ethnocentric attitudes did not react to perceptual
anomalies with more event-related centroparietal cortical excitation (for a moderated ERP
curve, see Fig 6). There were also no effects of data set or its interactions (all t(160) < 0.60, p>
.55). The analysis of LPP amplitude within the experimental group using linear mixed model-
ling revealed no effects of card type (normal vs. anomalous), attitude strength, or their interac-
tion (all b< .11, t< 1.17, p> .24).
All ERP components were also analyzed with absolute ethnocentrism as predictor instead
of attitude strength. The results are available in S1 Supplementary Analyses.
Discussion
This research was conducted to test the hypothesis that individuals with strong political
attitudes react to expectancy-violating stimuli by suppressing them. We argue that this
Fig 6. Moderated ERP curve. Calculated for participants high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in ethnocentric attitude strength, separate for participants in the
experimental group (normal and anomalous cards) and control group (normal cards only). Values are averaged across centroparietal and parietal electrodes, as used
for LPP analysis. LPP time window (400–800 ms post stimulus onset) is depicted by the gray rectangle.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220732.g006
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suppression manifests as a tonic increase in alpha oscillations in the brain. Indeed, we found
that strength of political belief moderated prestimulus alpha power in response to perceptual
anomalies: in participants with strong political attitudes, alpha power was higher in the pres-
ence of reverse-colored playing cards than in the control condition; this difference was absent
in individuals with moderate beliefs.
This intriguing finding is in congruence with the argument of Inzlicht et al. [9] that ideolog-
ically committed individuals gate their attention away from potential sources of uncertainty.
The size of the effect is comparatively small. However, since the manipulation is de facto sub-
liminal (or at least periliminal), the small effect sizes are not surprising. In fact, Randles and
colleagues [60] investigated the effect sizes of classic expectancy violation paradigms on behav-
ioral outcomes (here, working memory performance) with Bayesian inferences, revealing
small but meaningful effect sizes.
Based on evidence that politically extreme participants exhibited smaller pupil dilation
responses to reverse-colored playing cards than moderate participants [25], we investigated
whether the strength of political attitudes is also related to reduced phasic neurophysiological
responses (i.e., event-related potentials) to reverse-colored playing cards. This prediction was
not supported, as we did not find a parallel effect of political attitude strength on the ampli-
tudes of the P1, P300, and the late positive potential (LPP). One reason may be that stimulus-
evoked EEG responses (i.e., ERPs) and stimulus-evoked pupil dilation responses are not con-
sistently correlated [41,61]. The two phenomena seem to be related in a complex way, with the
largest evoked EEG responses emerging at intermediate levels of pupil diameter, not evoked
pupil dilation [40,61]. Thus, it is conceivable that reverse-colored playing cards evoke phasic
pupil dilation responses in the absence of phasic electrophysiological responses. We did find a
marginal moderation effect of attitude strength and experimental group on N1 amplitude.
This result is unsurprising given that the P1/N1 complex is at least partially generated by alpha
power [62,63], and N1 amplitude often correlates with prestimulus alpha power, albeit in a
visual paradigm [64].
Previous research suggests that conservatives show greater reactions to arousing stimuli [6]
or generally have a lower threshold for emotional arousal [65]. However, in the present paper
our focus was on the strength of attitudes, that is, the deviation from the group mean in an eth-
nocentrism questionnaire, regardless of political orientation. Our sample consisted of mostly
liberal participants, that is, university students (cf. [25]): the ethnocentrism scores in our sam-
ple were well below the scale mean of 3.5 and ranged from 1 to 4.40 (M = 2.08). Sleegers and
colleagues reported that both extremely liberal and conservative participants reacted with
intolerance when their worldviews were challenged [13,26]. Indeed, it seems attentional pro-
cesses varied depending on the strength of ideological convictions [66]. We can only speculate
how a more evenly distributed sample would have influenced the results. However, the finding
that the results are present even in our quite liberal sample further validates the strategy of
studying extremism as a deviation from the norm.
An explanation for why we found tonic but not phasic neurophysiological reactivity to
perceptual anomalies may be the subtleness and task-irrelevance of our manipulation (i.e.,
presenting reverse-colored playing cards). Conscious and task-relevant conflict, threats,
discrepancies, and meaning violations typically evoke phasic reactivity, a frequent epicenter
of which is the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) [16,21]. Dehaene and colleagues
found that only conscious detection of inconsistencies evokes ACC activation [67,68].
Although we cannot equate ACC activation with evoked EEG responses [57,69], the implicit
nature of our manipulation may nevertheless have prevented other phasic electrocortical
responses.
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Limitations and future research
This experiment adds electrophysiological evidence to the behavioral and pupillometric find-
ings from past research. We have shown that ideologically convicted, but not moderate partici-
pants, show tonic increases in prestimulus alpha power in reaction to anomalous playing
cards. Future research should expand on this finding with different manipulations.
One potential factor limiting the generalizability of our findings is the measure of political
attitude employed in this research: given the sociopolitical circumstances during the conceptu-
alization of the study, we used a measure of ethnocentrism as a proxy of socio-political atti-
tude. To increase generalizability of our findings, we suggest future research include both
general measures of political attitudes and attitudes in other political domains.
Our research is correlative, we thus cannot infer causal relationships between attitude
strength and electrophysiological reactions. There are two possible lines of causality that could
explain the obtained results. Either individuals with stronger attitudes show increased atten-
tional gating of possible anomalies, or individuals with decreased reactivity to expectancy viola-
tions hold extreme beliefs more easily. In this view, those who notice and react strongly to
anomalies are more likely to update their belief systems, possibly leading to more moderate atti-
tudes. This chicken and egg problem, however, does not take away from our findings. Future
research should investigate the direction of causality in the development of political conviction.
In our study, we did not assess participants’ prior experience with playing cards (e.g., play-
ing poker, casino visits) as a potential moderator of the observed effects. However, the fact that
the anomaly was only detected by four participants and the absence of behavioral effects lead
us to believe that experience with playing cards had no influence on the results. Future studies
should, however, investigate this assumption empirically.
Given that conscious and unconscious meaning violations seem to produce different neural
effects, future studies may also contrast them directly. Participants usually do not detect the
anomalous playing cards, which makes the manipulation especially suitable for creating
unconscious expectancy violations. Informing participants about the presence of reverse-col-
ored playing cards would turn these otherwise undetected perceptual anomalies into conscious
ones, thus allowing also for a conscious manipulation of meaning violations. The danger asso-
ciated with making them conscious is that participants may quickly accommodate their exist-
ing meaning frameworks about playing cards in such a way that hearts can also be black and
spades can also be red, which would remove the expectancy-violating aspect from these previ-
ously anomalous cards. A possible solution could be to use logically impossible meaning viola-
tions (e.g., Bill is both married and a bachelor).
For our research question, a between-subjects design was a more reasonable choice than a
within-subjects design: A within-subjects design where participants complete both the experi-
mental and the control condition may render higher statistical power but carries an important
caveat: detection of the anomaly may influence subsequent processing of the anomalous sti-
muli [25,70]. Indeed, the within-subjects analyses in the present paper show that the presence
of anomalous stimuli in the task had effects on both the anomalous and the regular control sti-
muli [25,63].
Conclusion
We found that the processing of perceptual anomalies is influenced by the strength of an indi-
vidual’s convictions, and that this influence is probably due to tonic attentional suppression.
Notably, this effect was linked to the strength of ethnocentric attitudes. Thus, convinced liber-
als may gate attention away from expectancy-violating information just as readily as convinced
conservatives.
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